Tuesday, February 11, 2014

Case study: Henriques and Maxwell in India in 2013

When Australia's squad to tour India in 2013 was announced my first thought was "is this some kind of joke?" It included Glen Maxwell and Moises Henriques, two bits and pieces players who were just establishing themselves in the one day squad but hadn't really set the world on fire. But it was unclear if Watson could bowl any more and Mitchell Marsh and Andrew McDonald was injured, and Dan Christian hadn't had a good season, and the selectors were desperate - desperate - that the team have an all rounder.

"We feel there's a great need to have an allrounder there" said John Inverarity, despite the fact Australia became the world's best side without one.

As Jarrod Kimber put it about Henriques, "First class wise, his batting was rooted in the handy half-century. His bowling seemed to lose all venom as he veered into bowling straight medium deliveries that even club cricketers don't fear. In List A he became a rare wicket-taker who could be fairly economical. As a batsman he barely made a mark at all"

Nonetheless Henriques was picked in the first two tour games, taking 4-12 in the first and making useful runs in the second. This was enough encouragement for Australia to pick him in the first test, batting at seven after Wade, Australia using a 5-1-1-4 formula. Byron Coverdale at Cricinfo said he took "the allrounders' position" as if such a thing was a given.

Australia batted poorly and didn't bowl much better and lost the game. Henriques had been picked mostly for his bowling but actually batted well, scoring two fifties - meaning we were stuck with him for the next few tests.

The selectors decided to boost the batting in the second test - not by doing something like, picking an actual specialist batsman (Smith was in the squad), but they chose another all rounder, Glenn Maxwell. The reasoning for this sort of 5-1-2-3 selection seems to be two bits and pieces players will equal more than one specialist batsman and one specialist bowler. Maxwell did take four wickets at a cost of 127 runs... neither he or Henriques contributed much with the bat.

Then homework gate happened and Watson was booted out of side for the third test and Smith came in. They dropped Maxwell because, said Mickey Arthur, "we need to take 20 wickets to win this Test match so we wanted our specialists out on the park." However the selectors held the faith with non-specialist Henriques, which of course weakened the batting without particularly strengthening the bowling -  he repaid them with 2 runs and one wicket.

Australia finally booted him for the fourth test but doggedly stuck to the 5-1-1-4 formula, picking Maxwell, who took a couple of wickets and a couple (literally) of runs.

Australia made a couple of selection blunders in India - Doherty for Lyon, for instance - but easily the most disastrous was their dogged insistence on the all rounder policy.

Henriques averages 30 with the bat at first class level after a lot of summers and has less than two wickets per game.

Maxwell averages a few runs more but has an even worse rate of return.

They are the Phil Carlson, Simon O'Donnell and Trevor Laughlin of their era - one day cricket fine, Twenty20 you beaut, Shield cricket awesome, test cricket no.

Did any cricket commentator or journo comment on this at the time? If they did please let me know because I sure as hell didn't see it.

And Henriques is in South Africa right now.

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